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Dignity Rights: Courts, Constitutions, and the Worth of the Human Person. By
Erin Daly. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. Pp. ix,
229. Price: $62.96 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Allison Day.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) affirms the belief
that the "recognition of the inherent dignity . .. of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world."' Since the
adoption of the UDHR by the United Nations in 1948, many newly established
countries have incorporated human dignity into their constitutions. For
example, South Sudan, the world's youngest country, refers to dignity fourteen
times in its constitution.2 That document treats dignity as an aspiration, a core
value,4 and a justiciable right;5 it acknowledges dignity in every individual,
including women, children, people with special needs, and the elderly.9
But what do these promises of dignity mean? What rights does dignity
protect that are not already secured by other constitutional assurances such as
liberty and equality? Questions like these have sparked a debate over the
meaning of dignity. Leading the debate, Christopher McCrudden claims that
there are no "detailed universal interpretation[s], nor even particularly coherent
national interpretations" of dignity.' 0 As a result, dignity is of little substantive
value, evidenced by the "very different outcomes. . . derived from the
application of dignity arguments."" In response, a rising tide of scholars argues
that, while there is no single, universally accepted understanding of dignity,
there is a universally accepted set of understandings of dignity, composed of
various understandings that can be invoked in constitutional decisions.12 These
I. Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl., G.A. Res. 217(11 )A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(ll l), Dec. 10, 1948.
2. The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, REFWORLD (July 9, 2011),
http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmaindocid=4e269a3e2.
3. Id. pmbl. ("Committed ... to upholding values of human dignity and equal rights .....
4. Id. T. 1(5) ("South Sudan is founded on justice, equality, respect for human dignity and
advancement of human rights and fundamental freedoms.").
5. Id. II ("Every person has the inherent right to life, dignity, and the integrity of his or her
person which shall be protected by law . . .
6. Id.
7. Id. T 16(1) ("Women shall be accorded full and equal dignity with men."); id. 16(4) ("All
levels of government shall.. enact laws to combat harmful customs and traditions which undermine
the dignity and status of women.").
8. Id. T 17(1) ("Every child has the right .. .not to be subjected to negative and harmful
cultural practices which affect his or her health, welfare or dignity . . . .").
9. Id. T 30(2) ("The elderly and persons with disabilities or special needs shall have the right
to the respect of their dignity.").
10. Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19
EUR. J. INT'L L. 655, 724 (2008).
11. Id.at698.
12. See, e.g., Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169
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responses focus primarily on American jurisprudence, leaving McCrudden's
claim that there is no universal interpretation and no cross-cultural substantive
value to dignity largely unchallenged.
Erin Daly's Dignity Rights: Courts, Constitutions, and the Worth of the
Human Person takes up this challenge by painting a sweeping portrait of
dignity jurisprudence around the world. Daly argues that dignity has "evolved[]
over the last half century, from an inchoate idea to an enforceable right
variously recognized throughout the world" (p. 2). She then proceeds to show
that the "right to dignity has content and boundaries" consistent across borders,
using the language of constitutional courts from each continent to articulate
these common meanings (p. 5). In the final chapters of the book, Daly goes on
to say that not only does the right to dignity have a consistent meaning, it also
has a consistent impact: dignity discourse changes the way in which individuals
view themselves and relate to the state.
Daly's initial claim is that dignity has transformed from a constitutional
value, which informs and supports other rights, to an independent, enforceable
constitutional right. According to Daly, individuals can cite this right to "assert
claims against the state" that "courts will enforce and that governments are
bound to respect" (p. 25). According to Daly, constitutional courts enforce a
right to dignity regardless of whether dignity is explicitly written into a
constitutional text (as in Germany, South Africa, Colombia, Israel, and India)
or merely inferred (as in Canada and the United States) (p. 2). She supports this
assertion with language pulled from a vast array of decisions from
constitutional courts around the globe.
Daly's argument is most convincing when the case language she cites is
supported by descriptions of the case's outcome. Sadly, Daly does not often
engage in an analysis of case outcomes and, when she does, it is often for
relatively limited impact cases. For example, Daly describes the outcomes of
the French and German "dwarf-throwing" cases, in which courts banned dwarf-
throwing "as a violation of the dwarf's human dignity" (p. 52). Similarly, she
details the outcome of the Hungarian court's cases involving names, which held
that individuals have a right to use their own names because "the uniqueness of
each individual person . .. is ensured by his or her innate dignity," but they do
not have a "right to choose, change, or amend a name" (p. 32). By presenting
the outcomes that result from invoking dignity, Daly convinces the reader that
dignity is acting as an enforceable right, protecting individuals from certain
government actions.
However, the reader is often uncertain of how courts' discussion of
dignity changes the result of many important cases. Daly neglects to explain the
consequences of invoking dignity in cases involving national security,
affirmative action, and privacy and in doing so, she misses an opportunity to
convince the reader of the value of a right to dignity in these high-profile cases.
This weakness is most striking in Daly's treatment of dignity discourse in




abortion cases. Daly spends only three pages discussing abortion cases, and in
those pages addresses only the language cited by the constitutional courts. Daly
notes that dignity as personal autonomy "is most vivid in the [United States]
Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence," (p. 39) and that "dignity is implicated
in both decisional autonomy and the right to life" in German abortion cases (p.
42). Yet she neglects to discuss the difference in holdings between American
cases, which prohibit the criminalization of abortion, and German cases, which
allow criminalization with certain exceptions. 3 By remaining silent about the
outcomes of such cases, Daly loses ground to critics who assert that dignity is a
value, susceptible to use by either side of a conflict, rather than an enforceable
right with specific content.
Daly further claims that not only is dignity a right, it is also a right with
specific content. Daly outlines three modem conceptions of dignity: (1) dignity
as autonomy or individuation, protecting personal choice, equality, and anti-
objectification; (2) dignity as a minimal quality of life, protecting socio-
economic rights; and (3) dignity as a limit on state control, protecting the rights
of those in state custody. The sheer scope of case law presented is likely to
convince the reader that there are, in fact, agreed upon meanings of dignity.
Despite the diversity of Daly's examples and the strength of her analysis,
however, her categories are subject to potential critiques.
For example, Daly does not account for the unique aspects of American
dignity jurisprudence she discusses in Chapter Four of Dignity Rights. She
argues that "uniquely in the world, the U.S. Supreme Court has always been
much more comfortable attaching dignity to inanimate things, such as states
and courts and contracts, than to human beings" (p. 71). Rather than analyzing
American case law through her categories, she presents a new distinction
between institutional and individual dignity that applies only to American
jurisprudence. The stark break between her international and American analysis
derails the flow of her argument and undermines the universality of her claims.
Daly's argument similarly fails to address McCrudden's claim that,
though there are common global trends in how dignity is defined, each country
selectively utilizes conceptions of dignity that are suited to their "ideological,
religious, and cultural" beliefs.14 For example, McCrudden highlights the
divide between courts that treat dignity as a "communitarian" value, such as
Germany, and courts that treat dignity as an "individual" value, such as the
United States, Canada, and Hungary.15 By not acknowledging and accounting
for these differences between countries' uses of dignity, Daly misses an
opportunity to defend her claim that there are universal understandings of
dignity.
13. See Reva Siegel, The Constitutionalization of Abortion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1057, 1064-71 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo eds., 2012).
Though both countries' abortion jurisprudence has shifted to a more central position, in the original
1970s cases, "the US case struck down legislation criminalizing abortion in order to protect decisional
autonomy, while the West German case struck down legislation legalizing access to abortion in order to
protect unborn life." Id. at 1064-65.
14. McCrudden, supra note 10, at 710.
15. Id. at 699.
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Daly's final claim is that constitutional courts invoke dignity for two
reasons: (1) to "tell us about what it is to be human," and (2) to "define the
outer limits of public power" (p. 104). Dignity, she claims, is therefore "doing
the work of demarcating the line between individual and state sovereignty" (p.
130). Dignity provides a route for individuals to bring claims against the
government and allows courts to act as "the constitutions' avatars, ensuring that
the politics and policies of the day stay within the bounds of constitutional
limits and further constitutional values" (p. 147). These claims indicate that a
right to dignity, enshrined in a constitution or in a judge's decision, functions as
a promise-a promise to value all citizens and facilitate their voice in
government. Given this explanation of the work dignity is doing, the value of
dignity to newly established democracies such as South Sudan becomes clear.
However, is this promise to value and protect individual rights the only
work dignity is doing? In early chapters of Dignity Rights, Daly discusses the
right to dignity within the area of economic rights. This is an area where
dignity has created rights that would not have been protected by liberty or
equality. While India protects a right to a minimum standard of living (pp. 55-
56) and South Africa protects a right to adequate housing projects (p. 59) under
the auspices of a right to dignity, the United States fails to recognize similar
rights. American cases such as San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,16 rejecting a challenge to a public education funding scheme, and
Danbridge v. William,17 rejecting a challenge to a maximum limit on welfare
funds, make no mention of dignity. Would a more explicit discussion of dignity
in these cases lead the court to protect minimal standards for education or
welfare? A discussion of the absence of dignity discourse in United States'
socioeconomic rights cases could provide a clearer answer to McCrudden's
challenge and provide a concrete example of the work dignity is doing.
In the end, Daly presents a clear vision of the right to dignity's theoretical
or rhetorical value, but leaves unclear its practical value in constitutional
decisionmaking. She therefore cannot fully answer McCrudden's challenge or
predict the outcome of future cases in the newly formed South Sudan. By
limiting her discussion to the language of constitutional cases, rather than an
analysis of outcomes, she is unable to find a "substantive value" to dignity that
may shape those outcomes. Despite this shortcoming, the impressive scope of
Daly's Dignity Rights provides a valuable contribution to the debate over the
meaning of dignity and will hopefully prompt further comparative research
regarding the role of dignity in constitutional law.
16. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
17. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War. By Heather Harrison Dinniss. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pp. vii, 331. Price: $110.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Robert Nightingale.
Reading the first chapter of Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, one
might think that Heather Harrison Dinniss has set out to write a manifesto. Her
subject is the law of warfare in the strange new world built around the Internet,
and her prose at times recalls Filippo Marinetti's Futurist Manifesto in its
grand descriptions of technology's transformative power: "The entire structure
of society, governmental leadership, national identity, production values,
organizational structure, and even domestic attributes such as family and
religion have all been affected [by advances in information technology] with a
speed and global impact on a scale never seen before" (pp. 11-12). The Internet
will soon link to "every aspect of personal, business and public life" (pp. 12-
13). The world is becoming globalized, militaries decentralized and
civilianized, property and knowledge digitized (pp. 17-27). The information
explosion is "changing the nature of governments and sovereignty," affecting
"the distribution of power within society," "social evolution as a whole," and
society's "values and beliefs" (p. 14).
It is this last transformation that leads Dinniss to her boldest claim. So
that the general principles and "dictates of humanity" encoded in the traditional
laws of war may persist in the wired world, the laws of war must be adapted
not only to the new technologies, but also to the new values of the Internet age.
In intellectual property law, for example, "[fjormulations and interpretations"
of law bound to "attributes of physical property" and the "tangible world" must
change to reflect society's metamorphosis (p. 29). So, too, in the laws of war,
because "the information revolution has fundamentally transformed society on
multiple levels," when discussing the "general principles of the laws of armed
conflict, this shift in values must be taken into account and the reasoning
behind the statements of principle explored" (p. 29).
In the meat of her work, however, Dinniss does not do much to elucidate
how information technology has caused values to shift in the contemporary
world. Protections for civilians, civilian property, and the environment;
prohibitions on unprovoked armed conflict; and limitations on the right of self-
defense seem to be good candidates for the values Dinniss has in mind. Dinniss
does not, however, point to any evidence that these values have changed. At
most, she provides scattered statements made by governments addressing how
they plan to respond to computer network attacks (p. 56). These reactions do
not reveal any fundamental shifts in values, and Dinniss never claims that they
do.
Instead, Dinniss spends the rest of her work analyzing the practical
problems that arise from trying to reconcile the analog laws of war with the
digital age. Her analysis focuses on the usual suspects-considerations of jus
ad bellum (when computer network attacks might qualify as uses of force and
18. FILIPPo ToMMAso MARINETTI, THE FUTURIST MANIFESTO (1909).
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armed attacks) and jus in bello (how military participants and civilians are
treated in the context of cyber warfare). While discussing the latter, Dinniss
reaches aspects of jus in bello that would usually fly under the radar, for
example, what cyber warfare means for digitally stored cultural property and
for hospitals and other medical units (pp. 227-39, 244-47).
The book is undoubtedly a meaningful contribution to the literature on
cyber warfare. Dinniss makes concrete propositions for how to interpret
international agreements in the context of computer network attacks, and she
provides a comprehensive introduction to the laws of war and the nature of
cyber warfare for anyone not well versed in either subject. Her analysis is clear
and thoughtful, with arguments grounded firmly in the text and jurisprudence
of international conventions and agreements. She also engages fruitfully with
the cyber warfare scholarship that sprang up during the period she was
composing the book, most notably the work of Michael Schmitt.
Yet, Dinniss's bold claims about shifting values in her first chapter prime
the reader to ask questions never answered: How relevant will these
international agreements really be in the Internet age? If anyone with a
computer can strike at any target throughout the world, often through
untraceable means, and inflict real damage on those targets, and if states have
no means to prevent those attacks, why do jus ad bellum and jus in bello
matter? Are computer network attacks not a fundamentally different animal
from traditional warfare centered around the post-Westphalian state, one that
will require new legal regimes and forms of control?
Finding the answers to these questions in Dinniss's analysis is not a
straightforward task. She provides plenty of examples of how computer
network attacks fit awkwardly into the framework of conventional warfare, but
fails to probe the fundamental reasons why this is the case.
A good explanation, one not considered by Dinniss, is that warfare is
antithetical to the purposes of the Internet. The weaponization of cyberspace
may not be an inevitable historical truth but rather an avoidable outcome. A
host of sensitive information and systems are vulnerable to attack at present,
but this is not necessarily a function of changing values. It could rather result
from the Internet's ad hoc development. The current Internet is the product of
the haphazard agglutination of an enormous amount of data and users onto an
architecture designed for only a small number of users within tightly knit
research and defense communities.' 9 The Internet's designers did not anticipate
the number of networks or the diversity of users and applications that their
technology would eventually accumulate. They did not foresee that a need
would one day arise for robust mechanisms to limit the Internet's porous
membranes.21
19. Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC'Y 12-15,
http://www.intemetsociety.org/sites/default/filesfBrief History of the Internet.pdf.
20. Richard Bennett, Remaking the Internet: Taking Network Architecture to the Next Level,
TIME WARNER CABLE RES. PROGRAM ON DIGITAL COMM. 5-6 (Summer 2011), http://www.twcresearch
program.com/pdf/TWC Bennett v3.pdf.
21. Id. at 6.
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Efforts currently exist to redesign the Internet to fix the flaws in this
architecture, especially its security vulnerabilities. 22  Such a redesign could
render the Internet an inhospitable locus for attacks. For example, allowing
network operators the flexibility to limit cross-domain network operations
could potentially thwart distributed denial of service attacks like the ones
launched against Estonia in 2007 (p. 38).23
Even if a wholesale restructuring of the Internet's architecture never
comes to pass, states will likely craft effective means of warding off computer
network attacks. Computer network attacks differ from conventional attacks
because they tend to involve one-off exploitations of security flaws. Once they
occur, states and private actors figure out ways to counter them by deploying
24software patches. As complex as computers and the Internet are, in theory
these vulnerabilities are not limitless, and there is hope that states will develop
the capacity to fully guard against attacks. 25
As Dinniss points out, computer network attacks are not weapons in the
conventional sense, like magazines of guns and ammunition or ICBMs. They
are indirect, intangible, and diffuse (pp. 65-72). States have no monopoly on
their use. There will not come a time when Russia is said to have 32,000
computer network attacks on hand and the United States 50,000. They will
either remain intangible and diffuse or be wiped out by effective security
measures. There is no middle ground where they exist as a threat but are
defined enough as weapons to fit comfortably into the laws of conventional
warfare.
Dinniss assumes a porous Internet and paraplegic state responses to
security vulnerabilities as givens. From this standpoint, amorphous, poorly
targeted attacks causing widespread collateral damage will be an inevitable,
growing problem, and the laws of war will have to adapt. But this would be the
result of states' technological failure to preserve their sovereignty and protect
their citizens' lives and property. It would not represent a fundamental change
in society's values. States' inability to defend their citizens from computer
network attacks might make those citizens skeptical that their governments are
truly sovereign, but it would not make them devalue that elusive sovereignty.
This is likely the reason why Dinniss never really discusses how society's
22. Multiple routes have been suggested for accomplishing such a redesign. Practitioners in
the telecommunications industry have laid out steps that Internet service providers could take to change
Internet architecture from top to bottom. See, e.g., id. Others have suggested that the government should
spearhead efforts to develop and adopt secure alternatives to the three most important Internet protocols.
See, e.g., Robert K. Knake, Internet Governance in an Age of Cyber Insecurity, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. 25-27 (Sept. 2010), http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-technology/internet-govemance-age-cyber
-insecurity/p22832. Still others have called for reducing the homogeneity in the Internet's architecture,
see, e.g., Wesley K. Clark & Peter L. Levin, Securing the Information Highway, FOREIGN AFFS.,
Nov./Dec. 2009, at 8-10, or for putting technology in place to protect government and essential civilian
cyber infrastructure in the event of computer network attacks, see, e.g., Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber
Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects ofAttacks, 88 TEX. L. REv. 1533, 1566-67 (2010).
23. Bennett, supra note 20, at 9.
24. Clark & Levin, supra note 22, at 5; see Sheng Li, Note, When Does Internet Denial
Trigger the Right ofArmed Self-Defense?, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 179 (2013).
25. But cf Clark & Levin, supra note 22, at 5 (arguing that the manipulation of network
hardware for cyber attacks threatens to derail the effectiveness of software patches).
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values have changed in the Internet age or why those unspecified value changes
should affect the interpretation of the laws of war.
The manifesto lurking in the introduction to Cyber Warfare and the Laws
of War ultimately does not prevent Dinniss from providing an excellent account
of why computer network attacks are hard to square with the laws of war. But it
does prevent her from approaching the problem of cyber warfare as a military
general might: examining computer network attacks as threats to peace and
security to be dealt with like any other-rationally and soberly, with an eye
toward minimal disturbance of preexisting legal frameworks. Instead, Dinniss
frames cyber warfare against the backdrop of futurist hyperbole: the Internet
has changed us, and now it will change the laws of war. But Dinniss does not
demonstrate how.
Putting the manifesto aside, Dinniss's provides a path for how the laws of
war might serve if the technology for defending against computer network
attacks persists in its present state. It is a useful contribution but not a satisfying
one. It fails to address how states are currently responding to the threat of
computer network attacks and what measures might be taken to eliminate such
attacks. And it fails to show convincingly that the laws of war, rather than the
technology that makes computer network attacks possible, are the thing in need
of a redesign.
Armed Conflict and Displacement: The Protection of Refugees and Displaced
Persons Under International Humanitarian Law. By M61anie Jacques.
New York, NY: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012. Pp vii, 277. Price: $93.23
(hardcover). Review by Leslie Esbrook.
In Armed Conflict and Displacement, M61anie Jacques undertakes an
ambitious and comprehensive study of the treatment of internally displaced
persons and refugees, a group she labels "war migrants" (p. 4). She frames her
argument in two parts. First, she lays out the legal framework for the protection
of war migrants pre-, post-, and during conflict. Second, she identifies
shortcomings of the current legal regime. She argues that while international
humanitarian law (IHL) currently contains the necessary rules to regulate
internal armed conflicts, these rules are simultaneously not followed in
practice, and are much too focused on distinctions based on nationhood to
provide adequate security to war migrants. While the title suggests that Jacques
will tackle the complete corpus of IHL as it relates to displacement, the book
treats displacement writ large, incorporating the various branches of
international law and addressing their overlaps and gaps (p. 14). Jacques gives
the reader pages chock-full of the contemporary legal framework for
understanding war migrants' legal rights, so much so that it leaves one wishing
for a more fully developed analysis of the regime's assets, shortcomings, and
possibilities for the near future. The original theories presented grow bolder and
more fleshed out as the chapters progress; for example, by Chapter Four we see
an outlined set of guidelines used to assert that the criminality of forced
deportation or transfer should be covered by Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions or the customary rules of Protocol II. It is because of Jacques'
550
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keen conceptual ability to imagine reformulated provisions of the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols that the reader asks for more in earlier chapters,
such as the explanation of the re-definition of nationality given changing state
boundaries during internal armed conflicts in Chapter 1.
The book divides into chapters as follows: application of law based on the
conflict defined as international or internal (Chapters 1 and 2), a case study of
Israeli settlements which deals with the definitional of the word "forcible" in
"forcible transfer" (Chapter 3), application of law based on type of crime,
touching on the timing of applicable laws pre- versus post-occupation in
international armed conflicts (Chapter 5), and finally application of law based
on the classification of victims as refugees or internationally displaced persons
(IDPs) (Chapters 6 and 7). Jacques first analyzes the ways in which the Fourth
Geneva Convention's existing language on the protection of states' civilian
populations fails to grant equal rights to non-citizen civilians. Optimistically, in
Jacques's view, international scholars and courts have redefined 'protected
persons' and border-based nationality under Article 75 of the First Protocol and
Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention to account for a "more
comprehensive protection of victims in armed conflicts" (p. 45). Her argument
that such redefinition is necessary, but not yet sufficient, to protect state civilian
populations sounds quite rational but lacks novelty; the build-up to the thesis
recaps the major ICTY decision that expounded the redefinition26 but gives no
additional examples or analysis for future implications. The reader leaves with
a prospect of a fluid and expansive concept of "nationhood." Without any idea
of the standards of application the ICTY used, could its decision be but an
anomaly?
A similar tension between the expansion of civilian rights and practical
implementation afflicts Jacques's second argument in favor of expanding the
protection of civilians in non-international armed conflicts through states'
voluntary recognition of Common Article 3's applicability to "internal
,,27
disturbances". Again, while a novel idea, one wonders what incentives exist
for states currently evading humanitarian law guarantees to conform with a
more stringent protection of civilians. Given the argument that the semantic
boundary between internal armed conflict and internal disturbance is so porous,
it seems a more direct solution to attempt a better distinction between the two.
An avalanche of facts supports the historical precedent of the inadequacies of
current law, but the discussion on future changes pales in comparison. Veering
towards a different section of the Geneva Convention, Jacques uses the case
study of Israeli settlements to demonstrate states' relative ease of evading
current statutory constructions in order to claim conformity with IHL
26. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Appeal Chamber Judgment, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 15, 1999).
27. Common Article 3 lists prohibitions to acts committed by High Contracting Parties in non-
international armed conflicts towards persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
prohibitions on taking of hostages (3(1)(b)), requirements to treat the sick and wounded (3(2)), and
prohibitions on "humiliating and degrading treatment" (3(l)(c)). See Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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principles. This discussion evidences the scholarly field in which this book is
best received; Jacques's interpretation of Article 49(6) (distinguishing
illegitimate "forcible transfer" from the acceptable "voluntary movement of a
population into occupied territory") appears well accepted in the field but lacks
a detailed explanation for a lay reader (p. 86). The first half of the book's tangle
in the weeds of statutory interpretation affirms this intended readership.
Without some, or rather a significant amount of background familiarity with the
Geneva Convention and the Optional Protocols, a reader quickly becomes lost
trying to keep the article numbers straight rather than focusing on the more
important ideological propositions Jacques advances.
To the extent that the book feels rather disjointed in the first half, the
second half's analysis of certain ICJ and ICTY rulings regarding internal armed
conflicts presents a rare opportunity to merge the various provisions of IHL and
customary international law (CIL) assessed in the first three chapters and apply
them in turn. Here Jacques begins to shine, theorizing additional arguments the
Courts may have entertained to strengthen their rulings and extrapolating the
framework outlined in the ICTY ruling to the yet-undecided issue of whether
forced deportation may be considered a war crime in a non-international armed
conflict. Her style is clear and the overlay of IHL with CIL when applied
becomes much easier to follow. This section gives the reader that which she
sought in preceding chapters; namely, a discussion of the practical realities of
why such charges are not being brought in cases like Kosovo and Darfur (pp.
150-54).
The final three chapters continue to lament the antiquated distinction of
war-migrant status based on nationality as applied to refugees. Jacques argues
that non-refoulement, the principle that no refugee shall be returned to any
country where she is likely to face persecution, ill treatment, or torture, should
be "clearly established" to apply equally in all armed conflict situations under
Common Article 3 and Article 4(2) of Protocol II (p. 184). In the larger picture
of providing equal rights to war migrants in international armed conflicts as in
non-international ones, this cry for equal protection seems only natural. Yet
there is something about covering each and every current refugee law and its
deficiency in non-international armed conflicts that feels like a broken record.
The reader is not given a hierarchy of which of these major overhauls of current
doctrine should take precedence, nor a proposed path for how clearly to
establish these principles. Once returned to this level of general legal theory
absent a case study, the disjointed nature of the book's claims resurfaces.
Jacques' main contention seems to be that IHL has sufficient
consideration for "war migrants"' rights that have continually expanded in
scope and understanding as the nature of conflict has morphed. Given greater
enforcement and implementation of IHL rights and a push to redefine
"protected persons" by some type of allegiance rather than nationality, the
international community is embracing the protections of IHL and the rights of
displaced persons. Most of Jacques' specific proposals engage with various
articles of the Geneva Convention that protect civilian populations in
international armed conflicts but have yet to be formally revised to include the
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necessary civilians in non-international conflicts. As a catalogue of articles in
need of reform, the book succeeds. In addition to taking note of current
inequality in the laws, though, the reader continually wishes for a deeper
analysis of what the statutory changes would bring in terms of means of
implementation, standards of application, use in current internal armed
conflicts, and timeline for changes ranked by provisional necessity. The
conclusion itself presents various ideas to combat the problem of IHL
circumvention and ambiguity that are given no more than a few sentences of
treatment but tempt the reader with promise and potential.28 In an area of highly
evolving law, Jacques has given us the background necessary to understand and
interpret future considerations for war migrants' rights under IHL. Still, our
interest in the matter from the meticulously catalogued history presented here
invites a call for greater engagement with the doctrine's future potential, which
did not hold as much prominence as desired in this work.
The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict. By Sandesh Sivakumaran.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xix, 657. Price: $175.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Reema Shah.
In recent years the vast majority of armed conflicts have been non-
international, with at least one party a non-state actor. Despite this, the law
governing such conflicts remains largely misunderstood, with many positing
that the only norms regulating these conflicts are common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol II.29 In The Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict, Sandesh Sivakumaran seeks to refute these
impressions by demonstrating that a rich body of international law has
developed to govern non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). In doing so, he
draws upon a wide array of sources, from international criminal law to human
rights law, to show how these norms have shaped the behavior of both armed
groups and states.
Sivakumaran's detailed research on the methodology by which law is
created-and his commitment to drawing attention to the behavior of both
parties, states, and armed groups with respect to the law-make this book a
valuable examination of an under-studied subject. Furthermore, the breadth of
the book allows it to address the full spectrum of issues involved, from the
standards used to identity such conflicts to the substantive protections offered
to how these laws are enforced. Yet, its ambitious scope often prevents it from
grappling with many of the complexities that distinguish NIACs and, as a
result, many of the substantive portions of the book are analogous to other
28. For example, Jacques argues for the increased use of regional human rights bodies to
enforce rights of war migrants so that the case law of IHL may expand, the establishing of a non binding
instrument to reconsider existing principles of IHL or the creation of an impartial body to define
violations of IHL concretely and encourage states' rule compliance (pp. 247-255).
29. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2d ed. 2010); LAURA PERNA, THE FORMATION OF THE TREATY
LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (2006).
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works on the law of international armed conflict.30 Moreover, much of the
analysis is based on case studies of individual declartions or actions by various
armed groups. While these examples are generally insightful, there is little
systematic analysis conducted to make more general conclusions on the
adherence to certain norms. The reader is thereby left to extrapolate from what
may or may not be representative behavior.
In Part I, the author surveys the different ways in which international law
has regulated non-international armed conflict. He begins with a historical
approach, arguing that until recently, "situations of internal violence were
considered to be within the domaine reservd of states" (p. 9). Legal regulation
of NIACs was therefore limited to ad hoc bilateral agreements or recognitions
of belligerency. This system was erratic in its application, however, because of
a lack of clear guidelines on the standards that constituted belligerency. Given
these deficiencies, Sivakumaran provides a historical account of the
development of international humanitarian law, beginning with the work of the
International Committee for the Red Cross and culminating in the passage of
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II.
While indicating that the divergent opinions of states during the Protocol-
drafting process significantly diluted the protections offered, the author refrains
from delving into what different types of countries sought to establish through
the Protocol. The absence of these details is perhaps necessary given the book's
substantial scope. Yet it leaves the reader wondering what may have been
underlying these diverging views of the role of international law, whether it be
differing notions of sovereignty, a history checkered with civil wars, or other
factors-a debate that continues to the present day.
The limitations of the book's ambitious scope again become apparent in
the author's discussion of more recent developments in the field. He argues that
"[t]he period since the mid-1990s has witnessed a wholesale transformation in
the regulation of non-international armed conflict" because of the incorporation
of international criminal law and human rights laws (p. 99). In discussing the
contributions of these respective fields, however, little attention is given to their
potential drawbacks. For instance, criminal law is directed at individual
conduct and operates through post-hoc judicial bodies. This structure is very
different from that of IHL, which is directed at a broader group and aims to
shape behavior before violations occur. This raises the question of whether the
translation of criminal law into IHL norms distorts their content.
In Part II, Sivakumaran addresses the substance of the law of non-
international armed conflict, first by identifying the conditions under which a
NIAC can be said to exist. For years, the international community was unable
to agree on any set definition for NIACs, despite the problematic consequences
of leaving such a determination to the states involved. Finally, in 1995, the
ICTY Appeals Chamber defined such conflict as "protracted armed violence
30. See, e.g., LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (3d ed.




between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a State," which came to be widely accepted (p. 164). In assessing
whether a conflict falls into this category, the author focuses exclusively on the
intensity of violence and the organization of the armed group, maintaining that
the motives of the armed group or the existence of occupied territory is
irrelevant. But missing from this discussion is an appreciation for the degree to
which these factors are often intertwined. The political goals of the group are
likely to shape the form it takes, which complicates analyses of whether a
group's organization adheres closely enough to horizontal or vertical command
chains to qualify as a NIAC. For example, groups seeking to defeat the
government and establish a new state, such as the al-Nusra Front in Syria,
would be inclined to cooperate with other rebel groups so as to increase popular
support and expand horizontally, whereas separatist groups may seek to
consolidate their control over a narrower area. Moreover, factors such as the
existence of occupied territory play a crucial role in distinguishing the conduct
of NIACs from international armed conflict; Sivakumaran's dismissal of their
significance prevents him from later grappling with their potential implications
for the substance of governing law.
Sivakumaran also fails to address what body should make these kinds of
determinations, which inherently involve significant discretion. As
Sivakumaran rightly points out, "[s]tates are invariably concerned with not
affording non-state armed groups any legitimacy or legal status, including
legitimacy or status that may attach through the application of international
humanitarian law" (p. 205). Given that it is a decision fraught with political
consequences, which institution is best equipped to apply the flexible standards
delineated in the ICTY definition and determine whether IHL applies? On this,
the book is silent. The author then argues that transnational conflicts, which
have grown increasingly prominent because of the U.S. fight against al-Qaeda,
can be classified as NIACs, despite the fact that they spill across international
borders. He points to the Colombia/FARC and Uganda/LRA struggles to
demonstrate that other conflicts straddling international borders have been
treated as NIACs. While his conclusion is correct, Sivakumaran's analogy fails
to address the unique aspects of the conflict with al-Qaeda, which distinguish it
from the FARC/LRA examples-for instance, al-Qaeda's exceptionally
decentralized structure, its transnational political goals and, consequently, its
distinctive methods of perpetrating violence (p. 230).
Sivakumaran's subsequent analysis of the rules governing the treatment
of civilians and the conduct of hostilities offers a wealth of information, but is
weakened by his use of specific examples as evidentiary support without any
kind of systematic analysis. Drawing from Common Article 3, Additional
Protocol II, customary international law, and other sources, he divides the
civilian protection laws into three categories-those pertaining to humane
treatment (i.e., banning torture, p. 261), those protecting specific types of
persons such as the wounded or journalists (p. 273), and those governing
humanitarian assistance by outside groups (p. 329)-and then delves into the
relevant rules for each. In discussing the law on the conduct of hostilities,
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Sivakumaran uses a similar approach, dividing the rules into categories
depending on whether they pertain to targeting, means of combat, or method of
combat. The analysis provides much valuable information for the reader, but is
at times problematic. He uses an array of sources to inform his description of
the law of non-international armed conflict, including the declarations and
behavior of individual armed groups. But at times this approach blurs the
established law on an issue with one particular armed group's behavior or
understanding of the law, which may or may not be universally accepted. For
instance, with respect to the displacement of the civilian population during such
conflicts, "Common Article 3 does not contain an explicit prohibition on point"
(p. 285). Nonetheless, Sivakumaran infers a customary law that such
deportation is always illegal from the reaction to the conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia, in which the forced "displacement was considered 'the essence' of
the ethnic cleansing" (p. 286). While this one example is illuminating, it belies
the myriad of instances in which such displacement has occurred during non-
international armed conflicts and been legally justified as falling within the
"imperative military reasons" exception to the prohibition (p. 287). Despite the
frequency of such incidents,3 1 the author remains wedded to an understanding
of displacement law based largely on international armed conflict, in which
such exceptions are far more limited due to the different nature of the conflict.
This is symptomatic of this section's two limitations-a lack of
consideration for the nuances that distinguish non-international armed conflict
from international armed conflict and their subsequent implications for the
applicability of certain laws, and the use of specific examples to illustrate the
acceptance of laws, without systematic analysis to demonstrate that they are
representative. The latter issue afflicts the book's next section as well, which
focuses on the implementation and enforcement of these laws. In this section,
Sivakumaran provides a thorough examination of the mechanisms by which
armed groups and states obtain compliance with the laws, from belligerent
reprisals to external fact-finding missions. In so doing, he makes a compelling
argument that "a potentially useful form of implementation and enforcement
has been overlooked, namely that of codes of conduct of armed groups, and
their unilateral declarations and bilateral agreements" (p. 474). While
provocative, this argument is again based on a series of examples, with
instances in which such declarations have failed to bring about compliance (i.e.,
repeated statements by the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers) largely ignored. The book
then goes on to describe the role of judicial enforcement in the regulation of
these conflicts, through international and domestic courts, while pointing out
the limitations of such post hoc mechanisms.
It is only in Part III that the author at last provides some of the creativity
and vision that is missing in earlier sections of the book. He offers specific
proposals to advance the law governing NIACs, with respect to both
31. Recent instances of this include armed conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Somalia. International Displacement in Armed Conflict: Facing Up to the Challenges, INT'L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS (Nov. 2009), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_4014.pdf.
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substantive norms and the implementation/enforcement process. To further the
substantive regulations, Sivakumaran proposes developing laws to establish
combatant immunity and protect the natural environment. To bolster
compliance with these laws, he advocates engaging vigorously with non-state
armed groups through multilateral forums such as the United Nations, using
creative tactics such as targeted sanctions and including armed groups in the
norm-creation process so as to promote a sense of ownership. But some of
these proposals seem a bit far-fetched. For instance, the creation of laws that go
beyond protecting "aspects of the environment that impact upon humans" to
protecting the environment in and of itself seems difficult given the limited
resources available to armed groups engaged in such conflicts (p. 526). On the
other hand, Sivakumaran insightfully points out a crucial distinction between
non-international and international conflicts, which impedes adherence to the
laws of the former; namely, that "immunity from prosecution for taking part in
hostilities is a crucial incentive for compliance with the law of non-
international armed conflict" (p. 514). For fighters engaged in these conflicts,
there is little incentive to comply with the law, because they face domestic
prosecution for taking up arms regardless of their behavior. He makes a
compelling argument that this asymmetry highlights the need for combatant
immunity in NIACs.
Overall, this book provides a detailed and useful account of the relevant
law of non-international armed conflict. While its breadth prevents the author
from delving into many of the distinguishing factors of non-international armed
conflict, which necessitate nuances in the law, his treatment of armed groups as
potential sources of law and mechanisms of compliance expands the
perspectives on this topic. It also gives rise to creative proposals, such as
leveraging peer-influence in persuading armed groups to comply with norms
(p. 545). Sivakumaran's vision at the end for a new treaty that corrects for the
deficiencies in the current law and incorporates the views of armed groups is
inspiring, but is unlikely to be actionable because of the basic fact he articulates
throughout the book-the unwillingness of states to confer recognition or
legitimacy upon armed groups that challenge them.
US International Lawyers in the Interwar Years: A Forgotten Crusade. By
Hatsue Shinohara. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pp. 1,
248. Price: $99.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Charles Dameron.
In 1940, a young Hans Morgenthau-then just an assistant professor at
the University of Kansas City-threw down the gauntlet in the pages of the
American Journal of International Law. With the world at arms, he had quite a
few things to say about a discipline that only recently had purported to offer up
the promise of solving the problem of war. "If an event in the physical world
contradicts all scientific forecasts, and thus challenges the assumptions on
which the forecasts have been based, it is the natural reaction of scientific
inquiry to reexamine the foundations of the specific science and attempt to
reconcile scientific findings and empirical facts," he wrote. "The social
sciences ... have an inveterate tendency to stick to their assumptions and to
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suffer constant defeat from experience rather than to change their assumptions
in the light of contradicting facts. This resistance to change is uppermost in the
history of international law." 32
Morgenthau aimed his critique at the very heart of the international legal
order established after World War I, which was founded upon the Covenant of
the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the
Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact. Morgenthau's Article was a frontal assault on the
orthodoxies of a small group of scholars who had been influential in shaping
that order, which sought to orient international law around the principle of
collective security. The events of the years preceding Morgenthau's article-
including the Japanese invasion first of Manchuria, and then of the rest of
China; the Italian invasion of Ethiopia; and the German annexation of Central
Europe and Poland-seemed to make a mockery of this idea.
Yet, as Hatsue Shinohara notes in her new work, US International
Lawyers in the Interwar Years: A Forgotten Crusade, "[n]o major change can
be found in the writings or discussions [of leading American international
lawyers] before and after the outbreak of the European war" (p. 165). Their
remarkable silence spurred Morgenthau and other young dissidents to search
for new theories of the laws between states, and today the Briand Pact
continues to linger in the popular consciousness as the symbol of a bygone
age's hopeless naYvet6.
It is against this difficult backdrop that Shinohara, a professor of
international relations at Waseda University, sets out to revive and rehabilitate
the early years of modern international law and to pay tribute to the leading
progressive thinkers of that time: Qunicy Wright, Manley Hudson, Charles
Fenwick, and others who "formed a vocal and active group that believed the
study of international law can and should contribute to building a more
peaceful world" (p. 11). In recounting their efforts, Shinohara provides a robust
portrait of the fierce and fundamental debate that took place within the
discipline during the interwar years over the scope and objective of
international law. Her work demonstrates that in spite of the interwar legal
order's many shortcomings, international law today rests on a purposive
foundation provided by these idealist-activists. Yet for all its success as a
narrative account, the book delivers a tepid response to Morgenthau's blistering
challenge, offering only a qualified vindication of Wright and his allies.
Shinohara's story revolves around the proceedings of the American
Society of International Law (ASIL). Its starting point is therefore
appropriately set at the ASIL's founding in 1906. Chapter 1 briefly lays out
American international law's origins as a largely positivist enterprise, focused
upon the gradual accretion of rules among nations as a matter of custom.33
Accordingly, the ASIL's early leaders-Secretary of State Elihu Root and
32. Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L L.
260, 260 (1940).
33. For an example of the traditionalist viewpoint, see James Brown Scott, The Legal Nature
ofInternational Law, I AM. J. INT'L L. 831, 846 (1907), which argues that "international law is, if it be
law, a growth of usage and custom."
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Professor James Brown Scott-were concerned not at all with the development
of international lawmaking organizations, but with the voluntary adjudication
of international disputes through the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
established at the First Hague Conference in 1899. Even in these early years,
however, Shinohara identifies the faint stirrings of a new school that "compared
the individual in domestic society to the sovereign state in international
relations" and stressed the need for international organizations that would
restrain sovereign states through law in the same fashion as the state restrained
individuals (p. 17).
The First World War, of course, acted as a major catalyst for the U.S.
international law community, as internationalists saw their ideas embodied in
the Covenant of the League of Nations. Shinohara skips over the formation of
the League to Enforce Peace and the actual drafting of the Covenant to
concentrate on the sharp academic disagreement in the United States over
ratification of the Versailles agreement. Though the Senate turned down
Wilson's League, internationalists were ascendant within the ASIL: Shinohara
points to 1923 as a decisive turning point, when Root resigned the presidency
of the organization and the reformers took control of the agenda at international
law conferences. Their program advocated the steady "enlargement" of
international law, which Shinohara identifies as having three components: first,
the acceptance in principle of "law-making treaties" that, having been ratified
by a preponderance of states, bound both signatories and non-signatories;
second, the observance of the Covenant of the League of Nations as "the
constitution of international society, ... which not only prescribed concrete
legal rules but also contained a code of morality"; and third, the questioning "of
whether a distinction between political and legal issues, between policies and
international law, was necessary or even possible" (pp. 62-63).
The steady articulation of these principles in the face of realist skepticism
occupies the remainder of the book, with particular attention given to a few
signature interwar policy fights including: the adoption of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact; Japan's invasion of Manchuria and the U.S. government's reaction thereto
in the form of the Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition; and the Neutrality Act
of 1935, passed by Congress over the loud objections of internationalists.
Shinohara carefully illustrates the reformer/traditionalist divide on these
questions through the writings and remarks of U.S. international law scholars.
Shinohara's narrative and her analysis make for a pleasant read, though her
treatment of the Kellogg-Briand Pact feels strained. In spite of initial claims
that "[it] would be possible to assume that if it had not been for the Pact there
would have been more wars, because the waging of war would have remained
legal," (p. 3) and that adoption of the Pact was a sign that "international
lawyers can function as social agents," (p. 5) Shinohara later concedes that
supporters of the Pact "did not go beyond the realm of analysis, nor did they
pay much attention to actual policy," (p. 67) and that "[t]he Pact was not the
ideal legal device that lawyers had hoped for, . . . lacking precise legal
definitions and means for enforcement" (p. 83).
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Disappointingly, although Shinohara promises in her introduction to "take
a comparative perspective that contrasts American, European and Japanese
discussions, and ... examine whether the differences in academic discussions
among countries had an impact on diplomatic relations," (p. 4) her account only
fleetingly touches upon contemporary European views. Meanwhile, her
treatment of Japanese international legal discourse is mainly limited to the
work of Thomas Baty, a British lawyer and advisor to the Japanese Foreign
Ministry.
Baty, a scholar in the field of prize law who crafted legal apologetics for
Japanese militarism, functions as something of traditionalist foil for Shinohara.
Of special interest to Shinohara is correspondence between Baty and Yale
professor Edwin Borchard, whom Shinohara classifies as the dean of American
traditionalists in the interwar period. The author goes to some lengths to
associate Borchard with Japan's legal posturing in the 1930s, noting, "Even
before [Japan's invasion of Manchuria], a pattern of Japansese dissent had
emerged .... Japan found endorsement for its position in the traditional view
of international law, in particular as enunciated by Baty. Baty's arguments
found supporters, such as Borchard, in the United States" (p. 98). Shinohara's
focus on Japan is not so much a comparative treatment of international law
discourses as it is a devised critique of American traditionalists.
Shinohara finds surer footing in the World War II years, as plans for the
postwar world settled upon a collective security scheme that met the hopes of
American international law theorists. Here, US International Lawyers
documents the important roles played by Manley Hudson, whose proposals on
international organizations were used as a benchmark by the State Department
and Quincy Wright, who provided feedback on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.
Wright also served as a technical advisor to the U.S. delegation at Nuremberg,
where he liberally dispensed copies of the American Journal of International
Law to help "enlighten the work of this Tribunal" (p. 197). Shinohara briefly
tracks the importance of the scholarly writings of Wright, James W. Garner,
Borchard, and others in resolving within the U.S. government the question of
whether German and Japanese political and military leaders could be criminally
prosecuted for conducting wars of aggression. Important as their ideas were,
however, Shinohara acknowledges that they shared a place with power politics:
"Officials in Washington and London who were perhaps more politically
motivated to establish the notion of war as an international crime found it
valuable and expedient to coat their claims with legal reasoning from the
reformers' arguments" (p. 198).
Indeed, although Shinohara declares victory for the reformers at the close
of her work, she leaves only ambiguously answered the question of whether or
not the reformers' efforts were a driving force of international politics or
something closer to an epiphenomenon. Revisiting the 1947 ASIL convention,
she notes the emergence of critiques from a new generation, most notably legal
realist Myres McDougal, who challenged Wright and the other dons of the
discipline by offering up the idea that "'the canonized doctrines of international
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law' . . . [were used by] 'people at certain foci of power to get certain
consequences"' (p. 201 (quoting Myres McDougal)).
Although it does not satisfactorily resolve the tension introduced by legal
realists like McDougal or political realists like Morgenthau, US International
Lawyers shines as an adroit social history of a community whose normative
principles stand at the center of modem international law. "'Our task,"' Wright
told the ASIL's fiftieth anniversary meeting, "'is not to discover the principles
by which we can organize our friends in opposition to our enemies, but to
discover the principles which all nations share, and which if maintained will
constitute them a community' (p. 215 (quoting Quincy Wright)). Shinohara's
work is a meticulous and enjoyable homage to those who, along with Wright,
dared to dream of a law-governed world.
"Partly Laws Common to All Mankind": Foreign Law in American Courts. By
Jeremy Waldron. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012. Pp. ix,
288. Price: $58.50 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Cameron A. VanSant.
In "Partly Laws Common to All Mankind": Foreign Law in American
Courts, Jeremy Waldron challenges his readers to add an international
definition to a term generally used to denote something much more provincial:
the "common law." For Waldron, the term need not simply refer to the system
emerging from the law "common" to the English monarch's courts in the
Middle Ages-now the set of laws promulgated by judicial opinions rather than
by written rules-but, under this different definition, can also point to the
possibility of a kind of law common to the entire world. As Waldron
acknowledges, the latter concept is not a new one. The title of the book echoes
a second-century Roman text "All people, who are ruled by laws and customs
use partly their own laws and partly laws common to all mankind to govern
themselves[]" (p. 33). Waldron's project is to show what these "laws common
to all mankind" are, and make the philosophical case for invoking them in
American courts.34
The book is organized simply. Waldron, who is currently teaching at the
New York University School of Law and at the University of Oxford, opens
with a case study of Roper v. Simmons,35 the 2005 decision in which the U.S.
Supreme Court forbade the execution of adults for crimes committed when they
were under the age of eighteen. The opinion of the Court, authored by Justice
Kennedy, made reference to the fact that no other countries permitted these
36sorts of executions (at least by law). The dissenting opinion, penned by
34. Waldron makes clear that the law he discusses is different from the ius commune invoked
in other circumstances (pp. 43-46).
35. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
36. See id. at 578 ("It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international
opinion against the juvenile death penalty . . . ."). Justice O'Connor, though arguing that there was not a
sufficient "American consensus" against such executions to justify declaring them unconstitutional, also
remarked on the relevance of foreign law in American cases. Id. at 605 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("At
least, the existence of an international consensus of this nature can serve to confirm the reasonableness
of a consonant and genuine American consensus.").
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Justice Scalia, excoriated the majority for its emphasis on "the views of other
countries and the so-called international community."37 The result of the
decision was a political firestorm: "there were ferocious newspaper editorials,
death threats against some of the justices, and ugly talk of impeachment, and
legislation was introduced in the Congress which would prohibit any reliance
by a federal court on foreign legal materials" (p. 10, citations omitted).
Originally trained in New Zealand, where judges regularly refer to
foreign law (p. 17), Waldron finds all of this outrage rather surprising, and sets
out to construct a philosophical foundation for foreign-law references in U.S.
courts. As he mentions from the outset, and elaborates later in the book,
Waldron's position is wisely "modest" (p. 223). He does not suggest that this
new kind of common law should serve as binding precedent in the United
States-only that it deserves thoughtful consideration on the part of judges. He
writes that "[The jus gentium is not] supposed to be authoritative in the sense of
simply and peremptorily settling legal problems (in the way a legislated rule
settles problems)," but rather is "expected only to have a bearing on our
decision, along the lines of what lawyers have called 'persuasive authority' or
along the lines of Dworkinian principle" (p. 188).
Waldron begins his philosophical case by refining readers' perception of
"foreign law." In Waldron's view, Americans need not understand all
invocations of foreign law as impositions of the legal and political systems of
individual foreign countries, but rather as references to something like the
"laws common to all mankind" mentioned in the Roman text. Following
Justinian tradition, he calls this law ius gentium (the law of nations) (see p. 33).
In contrast to many commentators, who associate similar concepts of world law
with natural law, 38 Waldron defines ius gentium as "a body of positive law
regulating relations within states as particularly between citizen and
government but also sometimes between private individuals. . . . [T]he law of
nations," he continues, "represents a sort of overlap between the positive laws
of particular states" (p. 28, emphasis added).
Having defined ius gentium, Waldron proceeds to investigate the merits
of its use. He begins by exploring its impact on the education of judges. His
thoughts on the subject are both reasonable and topical, particularly given the
ever-increasing number of opportunities for judges from different jurisdictions
to discuss legal issues in an academic context. 39 Analogizing legal and
scientific inquiry-a comparison that the author readily admits has its limits-
Waldron explains that "ius gentium is available to lawmakers and judges in
every country ... ,reminding them that their particular problem has been
confronted before and that they, like scientists, should try to think it through in
37. Id. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 199 HARV. L. REv. 31, 85
(2005) (associating the Roper references with natural law, "universal principles of law that inform-and
constrain-positive law"). As Waldron argues, this "ancient entanglement of ius gentium and ius
naturale" extends back to Roman law (p. 36), and is also found in the work of Thomas Aquinas, among
others (p. 38).
39. Examples include Yale Law School's annual Global Constitutionalism Seminar and the
Duke Law Center for Judicial Studies.
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the company of those who have already had to deal with it" (p. 101). American
judges, Waldron suggests, can learn a lot from the analysis of foreign judges
addressing similar issues, and it does not make sense to deny them this resource
altogether (or, perhaps more realistically, to prevent them from acknowledging
it). His second set of arguments relates to transnational consistency.
For Waldron, recognition of ius gentium may be not only practical,
leading to more efficient extradition processes, for example (pp. 116-17), but
also principled, promoting a sort of fairness, rendering it more likely that cases
involving fundamental rights are resolved similarly throughout the world
(p. 135). Waldron continues by taking on democratic, textualist, and practical
critiques of his theory, concluding with a discussion of "[1]egal [c]ivilizations"
(p. 187). The final section considers ius gentium in situations where the world
does not speak with one voice, and suggests that even more limited, regional
varieties of ius gentium could bring benefits (p. 208). Although the chapter is
likely to frustrate readers who desire a scientific solution to the question of
what constitutes ius gentium-what if eighty percent of countries follow a
particular rule? what about 70?-Waldron's treatment of these questions, as he
cleverly points out in italics at the close of the book, is satisfyingly consistent
with the original Latin phrase, whose author likewise resisted quantification:
"All peoples ruled by law use partly their own laws and also, and most
definitely, partly laws common to all mankind" (p. 223).
Waldron is a careful writer, quick to acknowledge the limitations and
exceptions to his arguments. Despite his qualifications, Waldron's is
nevertheless a supremely lively work of legal philosophy-a text accessible to
lawyers who are not philosophers, and philosophers who are not lawyers. For
those who are familiar with Waldron's long engagement with the issue of
foreign law, however, there is not much here that is especially surprising. Still,
there is value in following along with Waldron as he forges his path, listening
in while he responds to critics of previous work who meet him at different
points along the way, and showing them how their own legal methodologies
might lead to common ground. Indeed, the passages and chapters in which
Waldron addresses counterarguments are among the most illuminating in the
book.
Consider, for example, his treatment of textualism. Although textualism,
with its focus on the language of a particular national statute or provision,
might seem to run counter to the broader inquiries that characterize the search
for ius gentium, Waldron shows that an investigation of how judges in other
countries read the words of an identical or similar provision-such as the often-
copied "cruel and unusual punishment" clause that originated in the English
Bill of Rights-is ultimately consistent with American textualism (pp. 155-
67).4o In Waldron's view, for the very reason that "[1]egal systems copy each
40. Of course, Waldron takes textualism very seriously in his other writings, as well, even if
he sometimes resists Justice Scalia's particular presentation. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND
DISAGREEMENT 82 (1999) ("[W]hether we are talking about a small-scale meeting or a large-scale
legislative process, the positing of a formulated text as the resolution under discussion provides a focus
for the ordering of deliberation at every stage.").
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other and they learn from each other," and textualism-when divorced from
certain forms of originalism-can help "relate one phenomenon to the other
and justify the learning by judges' attention to the significance of the copying"
(p. 167). His engagement with the question of which countries "count" for
consensus purposes is equally thoughtful. In the collaborative spirit of ius
gentium-style legal education, Waldron views Justice Scalia and others as
struggling along with him, rather than against him, in seeking out proper
principles of legal interpretation.
Given his support for the people (and their representatives') views in
other contexts,41 it is surprising that Waldron does not confront the popular,
expressive arguments against invoking foreign-law invocations in U.S. courts.
No matter the force of philosophy, many Americans simply do not want to see
foreign law in their Supreme Court's opinions. Waldron points out this issue
when he writes of an encounter between Justice Breyer and a congressman who
opposed references to foreign law, in which the congressman informed Justice
Breyer that he can read foreign law as long as he does not cite it (p. 83). Rather
than simply dismissing scholars' rather haphazard and imprecise invocations of
the Declaration of Independence's famous phrase as "platitudes," Waldron
might have conducted a more systematic investigation of the use of what
Thomas Jefferson called "the opinions of mankind" in American law, noting
that foreign law had a place not only in the development of our founding
documents, but also in their interpretation during much of U.S. history (p. 22).
42 But Waldron is ultimately a philosopher, not an advocate, so perhaps we
need ultimately judge the strength of his arguments on their coherence (both
logical and legal), more than on their potential for popular acceptance. And, by
the standards its author sets-Waldron explains that his goal is a work of
practical philosophy, "a sort of jurisprudence meets Roper v. Simmons"-
Partly Laws is a success (p. 23).
The Sovereign Citizen: Denaturalizaiton and the Origins of the American
Republic. By Patrick Weil. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2012. Pp. 1, 285. Price: $34.95 (Paperback). Reviewed by John
Wei.
In the United States today, citizenship is a right that can be renounced,
but not taken away. Citizens can voluntarily give up their citizenship by word
or deed, for instance, by serving in the armed forces of a foreign state at war
with the United States.43 However, the government cannot unilaterally revoke
41. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346 (2006) (outlining democratic arguments against judicial review).
42. David J. Seipp, for example, provides a useful history of citations to foreign law. See
David J. Seipp, Our Law, Their Law, History, and the Citation of Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1417,
1428-35 (2006).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (2006) ("A person who is a national of the United States whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by voluntarily performing any one of the following acts
with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality .. . (3) entering, or serving in, the armed




the citizenship of persons unwilling to relinquish it, for, according to the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence, the people have never conferred this power on
the government and such a power would be inconsistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment.44 In some countries, the state can revoke a person's citizenship for
the sake of the public good. 45 But in the United States, a different principle
rules: "the people are sovereign and the Government cannot sever its
relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship."46
The Sovereign Citizen attempts to understand the genesis of this novel
conception of the legale7 dimension of American citizenship. How and why did
American jurisprudence come to reconceptualize sovereignty-originally an
attribute of the state-as "something like a shared quality attributed to all
citizens, with each benefiting from its character of inalienability and
permanency" (p. 159)? Weil approaches this question through a microhistory of
denationalization, i.e., the governmental act of terminating citizenship,
devoting particular attention to the institutional structure and procedures that
developed for the denationalization of naturalized-as opposed to native-
born-citizens. 48 The subtitle, Denaturalization and the Origins of the
American Republic, gives a more or less accurate picture of the book's scope.
Despite their close relationship, the institutional structures and procedures for
denationalizing naturalized citizens fall outside the book's purview.
The three main parts of The Sovereign Citizen highlight the significance
of denaturalization to three broader social phenomena: the federalization of
naturalization proceedings, the redirection of denaturalization to political ends,
and the transformation of the American legal understanding of sovereignty.
Chapters One through Three demonstrate the centrality of denaturalization to
the federalization of naturalization proceedings. At the beginning of the
twentieth century, the power to naturalize lay primarily in the hands of state
courts, and naturalization fraud was a frequent occurrence. Congress responded
to this state of affairs by gradually restricting naturalization proceedings to an
increasingly smaller number of state and federal courts and eventually to just
the Naturalization Service, as well as by granting federal officials the power to
44. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) ("Our Constitution governs us and we
must never forget that our Constitution limits the Government to those powers specifically granted or
those that are necessary and proper to carry out the specifically granted ones. The Constitution .. . grants
Congress no express power to strip people of their citizenship, whether in the exercise of the implied
power to regulate foreign affairs or in the exercise of any specifically granted power."); id. at 268 ("We
hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation
against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race.").
45. The United Kingdom is one example. See The Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Act,
2006, c. 13, § 56(1) (U.K.).
46. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257.
47. The book specifically refrains from exploring the affective, political, and civic dimensions
of citizenship in the United States.
48. Following other scholars rather than the convoluted case law, I use the term
"denationalization" to refer to the government's act of terminating citizenship and "expatriation" to refer
to a citizen's renunciation of citizenship. See Richard R. Gray, Expatriation-A Concept in Need of
Clarification, 8 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 375, 388-389 (1975). Weil employs these terms in a different sense.
He uses "denationalization" to refer to loss of citizenship by a native-born American and "expatriation"
to refer to loss of citizenship by native-born and naturalized citizens, whether voluntary or involuntary.
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initiate denaturalization proceedings against those who had obtained their
citizenship through fraud.
Government officials, however, soon redirected denaturalization
proceedings to other ends. Chapters Four through Seven detail how, right after
its institution in 1906, the government began to transform denaturalization into
a tool to discriminate against the "un-American." Naturalized anarchists,
socialists, communists, Asians, and Americans residing abroad all became
targets for denaturalization, as did naturalized Germans and Nazis during the
World Wars. Unfortunately, Weil provides little comparative data on the
severity of discrimination against naturalized citizens as compared to similarly
situated native-born citizens, e.g., native-born anarchists, socialists. Various
statements throughout the book suggest that the native-born were less
vulnerable to denationalization than the naturalized (e.g., p. 56). But the only
empirical data which Weil provides appear to suggest otherwise. The book's
appendices, which provide figures on the denationalization of both naturalized
and native-born citizens for 1945 through 1977, indicate that the government
denationalized far more native-born citizens than naturalized ones during these
years (pp. 198-99).49
The final chapters, Chapters Eight through Twelve, explore what
happened once the government's aggressive denationalization program came to
the attention of the Supreme Court. In a series of cases beginning in the 1940s,
the Supreme Court extended ever more protections to citizens in danger of
losing their citizenship, until the Court finally recognized the citizen's
sovereignty in Afroyim v. Rusk.50 For Weil, the key to understanding this
development lies in the personal beliefs and convictions of the justices,
particularly Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Hugo Black. Weil
investigates in careful detail the evolution of both these justices' ideas,
devoting especial attention to the genesis of Warren's dissenting opinion in
Perez v. Brownell,I the first to elaborate the idea of the sovereign citizen (pp.
146-60). This new concept, Weil emphasizes, provided the necessary
intellectual foundation for explaining not only why the government is forbidden
from unilaterally denationalizing those with a single nationality, but also why it
cannot unilaterally denationalize those with multiple nationalities: "The right to
have rights . .. requires governments both to take care of the stateless and to
prevent the creation of additional stateless people. But citizen sovereignty goes
further than this by protecting citizens from unwilling expatriation even if they
also possess another nationality" (p. 183).
As recounted by Weil, the story of denaturalization practices in the
United States and the transformation of citizenship that they effected was
primarily an insular one. Immigration patterns and foreign affairs affected the
politics of denaturalization, but not the jurisprudence. Yet as Weil himself
49. Unfortunately, the data provided in the appendices for the years before 1945 deal solely
with naturalized citizens (p. 197).
50. 387 U.S. at 257.
51. 356 U.S. 44, 65 (1958).
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notes towards the end of his conclusion (pp. 183-84), the American experience
took place against a larger, international background and arguably fits into a
broader, global narrative on the development of nationality into a human right.
Two of the main motive forces in this larger narrative appear to have been sex
equality and the increased concern with statelessness occasioned by World
War II and the Holocaust.52 Article 15 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which predates both Chief Justice Warren's tenure on the
Supreme Court and most of the major Supreme Court cases on
denationalization, declares nationality to be a fundamental right.53 And later
international conventions elaborate more specific protections. The 1957
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, for instance, forbids
signatory states from automatically terminating the citizenship of women upon
a change in marital status or a change in the citizenship status of their
husbands. 54 And the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
stipulates that "renunciation [of nationality] shall not result in loss of
nationality unless the person concerned possesses or acquires another
nationality."55
What should we make of these parallels? Are they, for instance, signs that
the international community influenced the Supreme Court's jurisprudence or
vice versa? Might they testify to a broader shift in global attitudes towards
citizenship, one that went far beyond the confines of the Supreme Court? These
questions go to the heart of an issue which Weil seems to regard as settled,
perhaps prematurely: namely, the commitment of the United States to Warren's
concept of the sovereign citizen and its corollary that citizenship can be
voluntarily renounced, but not involuntarily taken away. If the sovereign citizen
is just the product of a battle of ideas that took place in the Supreme Court and
is unrelated to a larger sea change in American or international values, then it
rests on a shaky foundation indeed. Absent broader societal support, a new
Supreme Court majority might well decide to scrap this not unproblematic
concept. After all, does it make sense to claim that the citizen's sovereignty
protects him or her from denationalization, but not even harsher punishments
like death? How comforting is it that, even with due process, "the Government
cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship"5 6
52. Cf Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 703,
707-714 (2011).
53. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights arts. 15(1)-(2), G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) ("(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. (2) No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality."). Both of those
provisions in Article 15 made their way nearly verbatim into Article 20 of the 1969 American
Convention on Human Rights. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights, art. 20, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
54. Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, art. 1, Feb. 1, 1957, 309 U.N.T.S. 65
("Each Contracting State agrees that neither the celebration nor the dissolution of a marriage between
one of its nationals and an alien, nor the change of nationality by husband during marriage, shall
automatically affect the nationality of the wife.").
55. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, art. 7.1(a), Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S.
175.
56. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
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but that with due process the government can sever this relationship by
extinguishing a citizen's life?
Yet, however questionable it might be that Warren's concept of the
sovereign citizen will withstand the test of time, we can safely put aside such
doubts for The Sovereign Citizen. Weil has written an extremely learned and
carefully researched book. It will surely remain of interest to historians,
political theorists, and lawyers for years to come.
The Verdict of Battle. By James Q. Whitman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2012. Pp. 1, 323. Price: $29.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed
by Jennifer Skene.
Warfare prior the development of the modem law of war is often
portrayed as barbaric and inhumane. After all, thousands were killed for the
personal interests of their monarchs, pillaging the dead was a common practice,
and there was nothing resembling humanitarian restraints on savagery. With no
written law of war to channel their brutality, battles prior to the twentieth
century appear today to have been chaotic, unregulated, devastating free-for-
alls.
Yet, as Professor James Whitman compellingly argues in The Verdict of
Battle, battles before the 1860s were, compared to today's wars, "a blessing"
(p. 4). In the modern day, it is all too common to hear about tens, hundreds, or
thousands of civilians being killed in an armed attack. Wars rage on for years
with no apparent victor. In the eighteenth century, by contrast, pitched battles
were strikingly self-contained affairs. They usually began at sunrise and were
decided by sunset on that same day. In addition, they were restricted within a
single field of combat. Civilians did not have to fear for their lives, even when
battles raged only miles away. Farmers, Whitman writes, could safely continue
to work in their fields as soldiers slaughtered one another the next field over.
How is it that today's humanitarian-focused law of war is unable to
accomplish what eighteenth-century warfare achieved, namely limited, decisive
battles? How were conflicts so contained in the eighteenth century in a way that
seems unthinkable today?
The answer, Whitman explains, lies in the rule of law. Whitman's central
argument is that the battles of the eighteenth century were "not a plague on
mankind but a legitimate means of settling disputes and resolving legal
questions though violence" (p. 10). A pitched battle, he writes, was "a
ritualized means of focusing, and therefore containing, the violence of war"
(p. 5). Battles were a form of trial-essentially large-scale trials by combat.
The two sides were litigants disputing claims to property and power.
If the battle itself was the trial, then the determination of a victor was the
verdict. Whitman introduces the term "jus victoriae," or "law of victory," to
describe the law governing pre-nineteenth-century battles. Under the jus
victoriae, success in warfare was not contingent upon which side suffered the
greatest loss of life. This meant that sovereigns did not have to annihilate the
other side in order to claim victory. Instead, victory was based on which party
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was able to drive the other from the field of battle. Whitman refers to this form
of victory as the "verdict of battle."
The eighteenth century was the apex of contained pitched battles and the
jus victoriae. Starting in the late-seventeenth century, monarchs consolidated
their power and obtained a "monopoly on legitimate military violence"
(p. 138). This meant that nobles, who had previously waged their own
campaigns for their own benefits, no longer had the right to conduct war.
Battles became a form of legitimate property litigation between monarchs.
Furthermore, as a reaction against the recent devastating wars of religion,
monarchs did not tend to wage war for ideological purposes.
The concept of battles as a legitimate form of litigation is entirely foreign
to us today. To illustrate just how different the conception of warfare was in the
eighteenth century, Whitman provides the example of Frederick the Great's
invasion of Silesia from 1740 to1742. Our modem sensibilities view his actions
as indefensible and blatantly illegal. Yet, at the time, rulers and jurists saw the
invasion as a perfectly legal means for Frederick to assert against Maria Teresa
his right to succeed as the ruler of Silesia.
The pitched battle, according to Whitman, began to decline with the rise
of republics. In contrast to the eighteenth-century monarchs, republics did not
wage wars based on property rights; they waged wars over "republican
legitimacy" (p. 236). With the decline of monarchies also came the decline of
accepted legitimacy. Wars were no longer between sovereigns who disputed
claims to land and succession but overall recognized each other's legitimacy.
Instead, countries that fight today often do so in order to assert their
sovereignty or to disavow the sovereignty of another. Whitman argues, "Every
move we make that seems to question the sovereignty of other states creates a
bit more incentive for those states to prove their sovereignty through violence."
(p. 255).
The major difference between wars then and now, Whitman argues, is
that in the eighteenth century, monarchs were not fighting for "regime change."
As John Witt writes in his recent book Lincoln's Code, Francis Lieber
developed the beginnings of the modem law of war while the United States was
fighting for a regime change. President Lincoln declared war on the
Confederacy not for property or succession, but for principles of morality.
Since then, humanitarian interests and challenges to other states' sovereignty
have become the central causes of warfare.
Whitman's book transforms the understanding of today's law of war. The
transformation to morality-based war would seem to be progressive and ideal.
It would seem obvious to us that wars to protect the rights of individuals would
be the most justified and humane. Indeed, one of the leading scholars of the
history of the law of war, Stephen Neff, has decried the non-ideological,
calculating nature of wars in the eighteenth century as "depressingly
57. JOHN FABIAN Wrr, LINCOLN'S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2012).
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materialistic. In the same vein, many people criticized the United States for
pursuing a war against Iraq for possession of oil rather than ideology (p. 256).
Yet, Whitman turns this criticism around and instead proposes that the
materialist purposes of war that we reject today were what made warfare so
contained and restrained in the past. When wars are driven by property claims,
as they were in the eighteenth century, parties have a concrete objective over
which they can negotiate with their opponents. Instead, Whitman says, it is
morality- and ideology-driven wars, seeking to remake the world, that are the
most devastating. Wars waged under moral pretenses "must be unlimited wars"
(p. 253). When countries like the United States attempt to bring democracy to
the Middle East, he argues, there is no room for negotiation and no conception
of partial victory. This leads him to assert that the Iraq War might have been
less devastating had the acquisition of oil, not the promotion of democracy,
been the primary aim. This is a startling claim to our modem-day sensibilities,
but Whitman argues his point convincingly.
The jus victoriae broke down because the combatants began to view their
enemies as unjustified in their causes. As a result, annihilation became an
acceptable tactic. Whitman does not discuss the fact that, under today's jus in
bello, all combatants are supposed to be morally equal. 59 However, Whitman's
argument still stands even with this provision. All combatants remain
legitimate targets,60 and, in a war for morality, one side would not feel
compelled to refrain from annihilating the side that is promoting "evil." Thus,
as Paul Kahn writes, wars have become much more like police actions. One
result of this is the rise of riskless warfare. When there is no sense of moral
equivalency, war becomes "the application of force to the morally guilty,"6 1
and drones and cyberwarfare become acceptable. Lives of soldiers on the
"good" side are seen as more valuable. They do not need to face danger in
order to inflict harm on enemy combatants.
Whitman reiterates the argument of critics of America's wars waged on
the basis of morals, justice, and the spread of democracy. However, he delves
even deeper into the issue to critique the jus in bello and jus ad bellum that
form the foundation of international humanitarian law. The problem with jus in
bello is that it focuses on the wrong aspect of war. It is the purpose of the war
that determines just how contained it is. Wars, he writes, "enter their most
dangerous territory when they aim to remake the world. . . ." (p. 262).
The eighteenth century's unique characteristics enabled contained battles
to an extent that was unprecedented and unrepeated. The decline of the jus
victoriae, Whitman notes, was inevitable with the changing political and
diplomatic alignments, the decline of monarchical power, and the rise of
humanitarian principles. Whitman's book does not offer any concrete solutions
to the problems of today's warfare. Indeed, he asserts that we cannot go back to
58. STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 91 (2005).
59. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 3 (2010).
60. Id. at 33.
61. Paul W. Kahn, The Paradox ofRiskless Warfare, 22 PHIL. & PUB. POL'Y Q. 2 (2002).
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the jus victoriae of the past. However, it does allow us to consider our current
legalism from a new perspective and reevaluate our emphasis on jus in bello
and jus ad bellum. Causes for the brutal character of today's wars run the
gamut from the legal framework itself and an emphasis on moral campaigns, to
the growth of democracy, and our tendency to ascribe historical destiny to the
outcome of war. With all of these causes, it is difficult to know just how to
begin to reconsider today's warfare. Yet, it does offer a comprehensive
perspective on why pitched battles are a relic of the past.
Whitman's work could have been enhanced by a more thorough
comparison between today and the wars of religion prior to the eighteenth
century might prove instructive. As he notes, the wars of religion, whether
between Christians and Muslims or Catholics and Protestants, were, like the
wars of today, fought over ideologies. The concept of the jus victoriae existed
at that time, according to Whitman. But it was not enough to contain warfare
since there were fundamental questions of legitimacy at stake. Whitman writes
that the warfare of the eighteenth century was in part a reaction against this
unrestrained ideological warfare. If Europe was able to react against this wave
of religious warfare and fight more contained battles, perhaps the world is
capable of doing the same again. Or perhaps we are too far gone to achieve the
same feat. Whitman writes that we cannot go back to the structure of eighteenth
century warfare. This was a unique moment in history. But he leaves open the
possibility for once again achieving a more restrained form of warfare.
Whitman draws on an impressive array of sources. He adeptly maneuvers
through history, legal philosophy, and even anthropology. He discusses novels,
artwork, and writings from lawyers, philosophers, and monarchs from across
Europe and across history to richly illustrate the eighteenth-century world.
Whitman's mastery of many different academic subjects is reflected on every
page. Whitman relies perhaps a bit too heavily on the work of legal
philosophers to articulate attitudes towards war throughout history. The voices
of monarchs, nobles, and legal institutions are minimal and may have added a
richer perspective on previous views of war.
Professor Whitman's book is a fascinating, eye-opening glimpse into the
laws, power structures, and philosophies surrounding warfare prior to the
nineteenth century. Authors such as Stephen Neff have discussed codes of
conduct within wars, similar to today's jus in bello.62 Whitman, however,
moves outside the framework of today's law to examine eighteenth-century
warfare on its own terms. He looks not at the jus in bello or jus ad bellum, but
rather at the jus victoriae and the treatment of war as a trial. By doing this, he
denaturalizes today's law of war and makes the eighteenth-century worldview
accessible, allowing for a true critique of how modem nations conduct their
wars. Whitman's book is compelling because it calls into question the values
our society takes for granted as definitively moral and correct. It even
challenges our conception of what is the rule of law (p. 204).
62. NEFF, supra note 58, at 114.
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Ultimately, Whitman's latest book is valuable both as a historical work
and as a reflection on modem warfare. It poses the question of whether our
humanitarian-centered system of law is truly superior to law of previous
centuries. Whitman acknowledges that with today's technology and ideology-
driven wars, there is no hope to going back to the contained warfare of the
eighteenth century. Yet, by providing such a detailed picture of what
eighteenth-century warfare was like, Whitman allows the reader to reflect on
the contemporary approach to combat and consider what the world lost when
we lost the supremacy of the verdict of battle.
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